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Background
• Sept 1993:  Revised Companies Act mandates 
compensation disclosure from 1 July 1997
• Previously, commercial surveys only information source: 
not much use to researchers
• Mandatory disclosure of employee remuneration a 
controversial move
• For:  Minister of Justice, Securities Commissioner, 
Shareholder Advocates
• Against:  Business Roundtable, Employers Federation, 
Fletcher Challenge, Privacy Commissioner
Reasons Cited for Supporting
Disclosure
• Greater transparency
• More effective monitoring by shareholders
• Comparability with government employees
• Align with international practice
Reasons Cited for Opposing
Disclosure
• Privacy concerns
• Fewer performance-related compensation
packages
• Commercial sensitivity
• Upward pressure on lower end of 
compensation range
• Compliance and avoidance costs
Economic Theory
• "An economist is someone who sees something 
working in practice and wants to know if it'll work in
theory."
• Executive compensation seen as a reaction to manager-
stockholder agency problem
• 'Optimal contracting'
• Alleviates agency problem.
• Compensation contracts provide incentives to 
maximise shareholder value
• 'Managerial power'
• Exacerbates agency problem
• CEOs extract compensation contracts that serve
their own interests.
NZ Empirical Evidence
• Andjelkovic, Boyle and McNoe (PBFJ, 2002)
•       CEO pay unrelated to past performance, 1997-98
• Elayan, Lau, and Meyer (SEF, 2003)
•      Firm performance unrelated to past CEO pay, 1997-98
• Implication: remuneration structures neither motivate nor
discipline NZ CEOs
• But based on small samples
• Gunasekaragea and Wilkinson (IJBS, 2002)
•      CEO pay unrelated to past performance, 1998-2000
Our Approach
• Use data through 2002
• Identify and describe 1997-2002 trends in:
• Compensation levels
• Compensation and contemporaneous performance
• Governance features relevant to compensation
Sample
• Firms listed on the NZ stock exchange main
board for at least one full year in 1997-2002
• Less those firm-years for which necessary data
were unavailable.
YEAR NUMBER OF FIRMS
1997 84
1998 88
1999 74
2000 75
2001 76
2002 79
Data
• Compensation and governance information:
annual reports
•     Otago University annual report collection
•     Datex
• CEO: includes salary, bonus, benefits, and 
shares, but not options or retirement payments
• Chair:  Includes director fees, but not consulting
fees
• Shareholder return:  OU NZ share price 
database
Average CEO Remuneration
Year Mean Median
($000) ($000)
1997 324 249
1998 342 255
1999 381 282
2000 401 321
2001 410 330
2002 456 355
Annual growth rate 6.8 7.1
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Average Chair Remuneration
Year Mean Median
($000) ($000)
1997 40.3 35.0
1998 43.8 40.0
1999 45.5 40.0
2000 49.5 47.3
2001 53.1 49.5
2002 57.2 50.0
Annual growth rate 7.0 7.1
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Pay-Performance Link
Year No of Positive
Sensitivities (%)
1998     48.4
1999     66.7
2000     50.9
2001     51.7
2002     61.0
Overall     55.7
Pay-Performance
Sensitivity ($)
    -0.17
     0.81
     0.36
     0.24
     0.67
     0.30
Perquisite
Retention (%)
     99.97%
Pay-Performance Sensitivities for
Top/Bottom-10 Firms
Firm No of Positive
Category Sensitivities (%)
Top-10     55.3
Bottom-10     58.1
Pay-Performance
Sensitivity ($)
    0.05
    1.57
Perquisite
Retention (%)
    ª100
    99.8
Governance ‘Principles’
• Jensen, Murphy & Wruck (2004)
• “Remuneration committees must take full
control of the remuneration process, 
policies and practices."
•      Should have a compensation committee
•      CEO shouldn't be on it
• "The board should be chaired by a person who is not
the CEO, was not the CEO, and will not be the CEO"
•      CEO shouldn't be board chair
•      CEO possibly shouldn't be on board
CEO And Compensation Committee
Year Firm has Compensation
Committee
(without CEO)
1997     43.4
1998     48.9
1999     54.1
2000     56.0
2001     53.9
2002     64.6
Firm has Compensation
Committee
(with CEO)
    3.6
    8.0
   14.9
   16.0
   18.4
   12.7
CEO And Board Chair
Year CEO is on Board
but not Chair (%)
1997     74.7
1998     70.5
1999     71.6
2000     62.7
2001     67.1
2002     64.6
CEO is
Board Chair (%)
    6.0
    8.0
    9.5
   16.0
   10.5
    6.3
Pay, Performance and
Compensation Committees
      CEO Pay Firm Size   Real Return Pay Sensitivity
      ($000) ($million)    (&%) ($)
Firm does not have  219
Compensation
Committee
Firm has        444
Compensation
Committee with
CEO
Firm has        314
Compensation
Committee
without CEO
27.6
292.4
97.2
-2.2
2.7
5.9
0.23
0.09
0.32
Pay, Performance and Board
Chairman
      CEO Pay Firm Size   Real Return Pay Sensitivity
      ($000) ($million)    (&%) ($)
CEO is not       258
on Board
CEO is on Board     302
but not Chair
CEO is Board          231
Chair
76.2
82.5
30.8
9.1
1.8
-4.0
0.30
0.26
1.35
Some ‘Summary Facts’
1. Growth in CEO pay exceeded inflation, growth in stockholder
wealth, and growth in worker earnings
2. CEO pay became more performance-based, but the overall link 
remained weak: $0.30 in pay for every $1000 change in 
shareholder wealth
3.  1997's lowest-paid CEOs produced better returns to shareholders
and had much higher pay-performance sensitivity than 1997's 
highest-paid CEOs
4 Remuneration Committees increased in number, but so did the 
presence of CEOs on them
Some ‘Summary Facts’ cont
5. Large firms were more likely to include a CEO on the Remuneration
Committee
6. Firms that (i) used a Remuneration Committee and (ii) did not include
the CEO on this committee produced better returns to shareholders
and had a higher pay-performance sensitivity than firms missing one of
these characteristics
7.  The number of CEOs on boards declined, but the number of Chair
CEOs stayed about the same
8.   Firms where the CEO did not serve on the board produced better
 returns than firms where the CEO was also a board member.
9. Firms where the CEO was also board chair had the lowest shareholder
returns, but the highest pay-performance sensitivity.


